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Abstract
There are objects with some periods of higher than normal levels of risk of accidental
atmospheric releases (nuclear, chemical, biological, etc.). Such accidents or events
may occur due to natural hazards, human errors, terror acts, and during transporta-
tion of waste or various operations at high risk. A methodology for risk assessment5
is suggested and it includes two approaches: 1) probabilistic analysis of possible at-
mospheric transport patterns using long-term trajectory and dispersion modelling, and
2) forecast and evaluation of possible contamination and consequences for the envi-
ronment and population using operational dispersion modelling. The first approach
could be applied during the preparation stage, and the second – during the operation10
stage. The suggested methodology is applied on an example of the most important
phases (lifting, transportation, and decommissioning) of the “Kursk” nuclear submarine
operation.
It is found that the temporal variability of several probabilistic indicators (fast trans-
port probability fields, maximum reaching distance, maximum possible impact zone,15
and average integral concentration of 137Cs) showed that the fall of 2001 was the
most appropriate time for the beginning of the operation. These indicators allowed
to identify the hypothetically impacted geographical regions and territories. In cases of
atmospheric transport toward the most populated areas, the forecasts of possible con-
sequences during phases of the high and medium potential risk levels based on a unit20
hypothetical release are performed. The analysis showed that the possible deposition
fractions of 10−11 over the Kola Peninsula, and 10−12 – 10−13 for the remote areas of
the Scandinavia and Northwest Russia could be observed.
The suggested methodology may be used successfully for any potentially dangerous
object involving risk of atmospheric release of hazardous materials of nuclear, chemical25
or biological nature.
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1. Introduction
There are some risk objects with higher than usually level of risk of accidental atmo-
spheric releases (nuclear, chemical or biological) during limited time periods of special
actions. Such accidents may occur during transportation of waste, or may be due to
natural hazards, human errors, terror acts etc. and various operations at high risk.5
On 12 August 2000, the “Kursk” nuclear submarine (KNS) after an accident during
exercises of the Russian Northern Fleet (RNF) sunk with its 118 crew members in the
aquatoria of the Barents Sea (69.62◦N and 37.57◦ E, cf. Fig. 1). A presumed cause
of the accident is the blast of a torpedo (Findings, 2002). The successful complex
operation of the nuclear submarine (NS) lifting and transportation took place in fall10
2001, following the preparation stage. The submarine was lifted on 8 October 2001,
and then transported through the Kola Bay to a dry dock of the Roslyakovo shipyard
(69.08◦N and 33.17◦ E, Murmansk region, Russia) on 21 October 2001 (cf. Fig. 1).
After the necessary preparations the “Granit” cruise missiles (in total 16) were removed
from the submarine. Then in April 2002, the submarine was moved into the floating15
dock “Pallada” and was transported in the dock of the repairing shipyard “Nerpa” in the
Snezhnogorsk town (69.33◦N and 32.83◦ E, cf. Fig. 1).
According to the RNF plans (ITAR-TASS, 2002) the removal of a nuclear reactor from
KNS and scrapping of its hull will be finished during October–November 2002. The
remaining 6 damaged missiles were removed from the submarine in late July 2002.20
Some of these missiles will be transported to a storage base and some (which can-
not be removed) will be blasted in the Barents Sea in an area located 58 kilometres
from Severomorsk (the RNF headquarters) or in an open pit of the Lovozero area (the
blasting place – 68.9◦N and 34.7◦ E, cf. Fig. 1). “The blasting of the missiles does not
make any ecological danger, as there is no fuel in them anymore and only explosive25
remained,” the navy officials said (Kursk-web-side, 2002). The KNS hull will be cut into
three parts. The nuclear reactor will be removed from the central portion. Some frag-
ments of the KNS nose compartment had been recovered from the Barents Sea floor
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and transported to St. Petersburg. Thus, the KNS operation involved several phases
with different potential risk levels including: (i) lifting in the Barents Sea and transporta-
tion through the Kola Bay to the shipyard in Roslyakovo; (ii) setting on the dry dock
and removal of the undamaged missiles; (iii) transportation to the “Nerpa” shipyard in
Snezhnogorsk; (iv) removal of the damaged missiles; (v) removal of the nuclear re-5
actors and scrapping of the submarine; (vi) lifting of the first compartment parts and
blasting of the remaining parts. Following the potential risk categories, suggested by
Bergman and Baklanov (1998), a very rough potential risk level ranging for the KNS
operation phases is shown in Table 1.
News media including Internet web-sites (e.g. see Kursk-web-site, 2001–2002) pro-10
vided information about activities and tasks, steps of the operation as well as meteoro-
logical conditions in the region. It should be noted that several organisations, including
RNF, took part in the preparation and performance of this operation. The measure-
ments of the radioactivity near the sunken submarine in the Barents Sea were carried
out by the Murmansk Marine Biological Institute, Kola Science Centre (Matishov et al.,15
2002). It showed that the radioactivity lever around the submarine was insignificantly
increased, but it was very similar to the background radiation level in the Barents Sea.
The water spread of possible radioactive substances from KNS in the Barents and
other Arctic seas was predicted by the German scientists (Gerdes et al., 2001). The
normative documents on the safety conditions and emergency preparedness for the20
lifting phase of the KNS operation were carefully elaborated by official experts of sev-
eral ministries of the Russian Federation (Lifting, 2001). However, a general analysis
of atmospheric transport and possible consequence forecast were not realised, only a
simple risk assessment for the local scale was performed.
Hence, it was very important, from one side, to carry out a risk assessment before25
the phases started, as well as from other side, to forecast and evaluate the possible
airborne contamination and consequences using operational dispersion modelling dur-
ing the high and medium risk phases of the KNS operation (Table 1). It became more
or less clear now that the risk of a severe accident with a large atmospheric release
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was quite low, but at the moment of the accident and during stages of the operational
forecasting such analysis of possible risk and reactor conditions were not available.
Therefore, in such cases researchers considered the worst-case hypothetical accident
scenarios, geophysical conditions, meteorological situations, and most dangerous pos-
sible situations.5
2. Methodology
In this study, a method for the risk assessment including two approaches – for the
preparation and for the operation stages – in order to evaluate possible atmospheric
transport, contamination, and consequences as a result of hypothetical accidental re-
leases at any of the nuclear risk sites (NRSs) is suggested. The Kursk nuclear subma-10
rine was selected as an example of such a risk site. In Mahura et al. (2003) the method
with a brief discussion was applied for the phases of the lifting preparation and KNS lift-
ing during September–October 2001. After that, during 2001–2002, the KNS operation
had continued and followed several phases/actions as shown in Table 1. During this
time the geographical location of the submarine had changed several times: starting15
from the accident location in the Barents Sea and ending in the “Nerpa” shipyard of the
Snezhnogorsk town on the Kola Peninsula (Fig. 1).
A reviewer of the paper by Mahura et al. (2003) stressed the importance of the
evaluation of dispersion and deposition modelling patterns, the estimation of possible
radioactive concentrations in the environment, and exposure doses from potential re-20
leases of radioactive substances from KNS. Therefore, in this paper, more detailed
description of the suggested method and its extended demonstration with a focus on
the assessment of the possible risk and atmospheric transport of hypothetical releases
are considered for several phases of the operation – the lifting, transportation, and
decommissioning steps in Roslyakovo and Snezhnogorsk.25
The first approach in this method is the probabilistic analysis of possible atmospheric
transport and deposition/concentration patterns from the site using trajectory or/and
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dispersion modelling. This approach can be used during the preparation stage, i.e.
when there are initial steps requiring consideration of the goals, tasks, temporal and
spatial frames, etc.
The second approach consists of evaluation of the possible contamination and con-
sequences using real-time operational dispersion modelling. This approach could be5
used in the late phase of the preparation stage as well as during different phases of the
operation stage, i.e. when there are particular measures taken to perform an operation
(for example, lifting or transportation of the damaged object posing a risk, decontami-
nation of the polluted area and/or facility, etc.). It should be stressed that although the
sunken nuclear submarine was selected as an example for this study, it might have10
been any object of potential nuclear, chemical or biological danger.
2.1. Approach for preparation stage
At the preparation stage, an approach, which includes three research tools, is sug-
gested. These tools are the following: 1) isentropic trajectory modelling (ITM), 2) dis-
persion and deposition modelling (DDM), and 3) set of statistical analysis procedures,15
including probability fields analysis (PFA), to explore the structure of the calculated
trajectory datasets. The isentropic trajectory model (based on a technique by Merrill
et al., 1985) was used to calculate isentropic forward trajectories originated over the
sunken NS location during 1987–1996. The dispersion and deposition model DERMA
(Sørensen, 1998; Sørensen et al., 1998; Baklanov and Sørensen, 2001) was used20
to calculate the concentration and deposition fields due to hypothetical accidental re-
leases of radioactivity from different geographical locations during the KNS operation.
The probability fields analysis (Mahura et al., 2001; Mahura and Baklanov, 2002) was
used to construct the monthly and seasonal fast transport probability fields, maximum
reaching distance and maximum possible impact zone indicators representing atmo-25
spheric transport patterns during the first day of transport from the sites in order to
identify the most impacted geographical regions and territories.
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2.1.1. Trajectory modelling
The trajectory modelling is a useful tool to evaluate common airflow patterns within
meteorological systems on various scales. In this study, among different approaches
to model atmospheric trajectories, the isentropic approach was selected. Although
trajectory models based on such assumption (adiabatically moving air parcels) and5
neglect by various physical effects, they are still a useful tool if the long-period statis-
tics is needed and computational resources is a critical issue. There are, of course,
some uncertainties in these models too, and they are related to the meteorological data
interpolation, assumptions of vertical transport, etc. (Stohl, 1998).
In this study, the National Center for Environmental Prediction (NCEP, USA) original10
gridded wind fields from the DS-082.0 dataset (“NCEP Global Tropospheric Analyses”)
of the National Center for Atmospheric Research (NCAR, Boulder, Colorado, USA)
were interpolated to potential temperature (isentropic) surfaces. The interpolated wind
fields then were used to calculate forward isentropic trajectories in the model domain
(20◦N–85◦N vs. 60◦W–127.5◦ E) for two NRSs: 1) the sunken NS (over the surface of15
the Barents Sea) and 2) Kola nuclear power plant (over the land surface in the central
part of the Kola Peninsula). Due to the fact that during operation the geographical
location of the Kursk NS had changed (site of accident in the Barents Sea, water path
of the NS transportation, shipyards in Roslyakovo and Snezhnogorsk), it was important
to consider the possibility of changes in the atmospheric transport patterns for the water20
and land locations.
The trajectories originating over the Kola nuclear power plant (NPP) region were
used from a study by Mahura et al. (2001). For the KNS region, the trajectories were
calculated for a period of 10 years (1987–1996) twice per day (at 00:00 and 12:00 UTC,
Universal Co-ordinated Time) at various levels (in total 16) within the atmosphere. From25
all calculated trajectories (more than 467 thousands) only those having origin near the
surface (more than 29 thousands) were selected for the further statistical analysis.
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2.1.2. Dispersion modelling
The trajectory modelling does not consider one of the important mechanisms of the
airborne contamination – the removing processes, e.g. the wet deposition, which is
most important for the deposition fields. The dispersion modelling can resolve this gap.
The DERMA model (see Sect. 2.2) with the DMI-HIRLAM meteorological analyzed5
archived fields was used for the long-term dispersion simulation with a permanent or
periodical discrete release at a NRS. The simulation period considered is October 2001
– October 2002. Several characteristics were calculated for the released radionuclide
137Cs: 1) surface air concentration of radionuclide, 2) integrated in time air concen-
tration of radionuclide within the surface layer of the atmosphere, 3) dry deposition of10
radionuclide on the underlying surface, and 4) wet deposition of radionuclide on the
underlying surface. All these characteristics are given in a gridded domain having grid
cells with a size of 0.5◦×0.5◦, of latitude vs. longitude. Conditions and input parameters
for the simulation runs are discussed in details by Baklanov et al. (2002a).
2.1.3. Statistical analysis of atmospheric transport and concentration patterns15
Probabilistic analysis is one of the ways to estimate the likelihood of occurrence of one
or more phenomena or events. The statistical analysis of trajectories might allow, from
the probabilistic point of view, to evaluate the NRS possible impact on geographical
regions or territories due to atmospheric transport. The statistical analysis of concen-
tration/deposition fields might allow identifying the geographical areas at the highest20
risk of radionuclide contamination due to atmospheric transport and deposition (dry
and/or wet) on the underlying surface.
The most interest in this study will be presented by the following indicators: the fast
transport (FT) probability field, maximum reaching distance (MRD), maximum possible
impact zone (MPIZ), and average integral concentration (AIC) field. Although other in-25
dicators such as simple characteristics of the NRS possible impact, atmospheric trans-
port pathways, airflow patterns, precipitation factor, etc. might be considered for the
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nuclear risk sites (Mahura et al., 1999; Baklanov et al., 2002; Mahura, 2002; Mahura
and Baklanov, 2002; Mahura et al., 2003).
For the construction of each of the mentioned indicators, a new gridded domain was
built with the risk site in the centre of domain. For the construction of the FT, MPIZ,
and MRD indicators based on trajectory modelling results, as input data, the latitude5
and longitude of trajectories (at 12 and 24 h of atmospheric transport) were used. For
the construction of the AIC indicator based on dispersion modelling results, as input
data, the 2-dimensional fields of the integrated in time air concentration of radionu-
clide (in each grid cell of domain) within the surface layer of the atmosphere were used.
10
2.1.3.1. Fast transport probability fields
The fast transport probability field (FTPF) indicates the probability of the air parcels
movement during the first day of transport. Such indicator shows where air parcels
might be located geographically after the first 12 and 24h of atmospheric transport15
from the NRS location. In this approach, we analysed separately only trajectories ter-
minated exactly after 12 and 24h of transport. The areas with the highest occurrence
of trajectory intersections with the grid domain cells will reflect territories under the
highest possible impact from the nuclear risk site, if an accidental release occurred.
To construct the FT fields, the number of trajectory intersections with each grid20
cell of a new gridded domain was counted. Among all grid cells, the cell where the
absolute maximum of trajectory intersections took place was identified as an “absolute
maximum cell” (AMC). Because all trajectories start near the NRS region, to account
for contribution into flow at the larger distances from the site, the area of maximum
was extended to cells adjacent to AMC. For this purpose, the number of intersections25
in cells adjacent to AMC was compared, and additional cells (having less than 10% of
difference between cells) were assigned. The new “area of maximums”, if isolines are
drawn, will represent the area of the highest probability of the possible impact (AHPPI)
from NRS. Assuming the value of 100% for this area, the rest could be re-calculated
1523
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as percentage of AHPPI.
2.1.3.2. Maximum reaching distance and maximum possible impact zone Indi-
cators
5
The maximum possible impact zone (MPIZ) indicator shows the boundaries of a
territory on a geographical map with the highest probability of being reached by
trajectories during the first day of transport from the site.
To construct the MPIZ indicator, all endpoints of 12-hours intervals of calculated
trajectories only during the first day (i.e. at 12 and 24 h) of transport were counted in10
the cells of a new gridded domain. Similarly to the FTPF construction, both the AMC
and AHPPI were identified. For the MPIZ indicator, it was assumed that the area of
MPIZ includes all cells with an isoline of more than 90% of AHPPI, and an isoline of
MPIZ was drawn through these cells.
The maximum reaching distance (MRD) indicator shows the farthest boundaries on15
the geographical map which might be reached during the first day of atmospheric trans-
port by, at least, one trajectory originating over the risk site location.
To construct the MRD indicator, all endpoints of 12-hours intervals of calculated
trajectories during the first day (i.e. at 12 and 24 h) of atmospheric transport were
counted in the cells of a new gridded domain. An isoline of MRD was drawn through20
the grid cells of the domain where, at least, one trajectory intersected with the
boundaries of the grid cell.
2.1.3.3. Average integral concentration fields
25
The dispersion modelling results can be analyzed in a similar manner to those
for the trajectory modelling results. Further, the focus is on the integrated in time con-
centration of radionuclide. The average integral concentration (AIC) field is an average
(at any given day of the analysed time period) integrated in time air concentration of
1524
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radionuclide within the surface layer of the atmosphere. This type of the field shows
the most probable geographical distribution of the radionuclide concentration near the
surface due to atmospheric transport from the site.
To construct the AIC field, the total sum of daily continuous discrete releases of
radioactivity at the site during the time period of interest (month) was counted in each5
grid cell of the domain. Then, an average value (or AIC) was obtained by division of
values in each cell by the number of valid days (i.e. when meteorological data were
available for operational dispersion modelling). An isoline of AIC was drawn through
the grid cells of the domain with the equal orders of magnitude starting from 10−1.
Similarly to AIC, the average fields representing the dry, wet, and total deposition10
patterns due to atmospheric transport from the site could be simulated as suggested
by AR-NARP (2001–2002), Baklanov et al. (2002a).
2.2. Approach for operation stage
At the operation stage, an approach, which includes two research tools, is suggested.
These tools are the following: 1) 3-dimensional Danish Emergency Response Model15
for Atmosphere (DERMA), and 2) HIgh Resolution Limit Area Model (HIRLAM). Both
models are operationally used and further developed by the Danish Meteorological
Institute (DMI). The DMI-HIRLAM model (used as a numerical weather prediction –
NWP-model) simulates the 3-dimensional fields for meteorological variables needed as
input for the DERMA model. The DERMA model simulates the radionuclide transport,20
dispersion, and deposition for the hypothetical accidental release at the selected geo-
graphical locations of the submarine during the KNS operations. Further, the DERMA
simulation results were used for comparison with the trajectory modelling results.
2.2.1. Operational emergency modelling
The Danish Emergency Response Model of the Atmosphere (DERMA) is used for the25
real-time modelling of possible contamination and consequences (cf. Fig. 2). The
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model was developed at the Danish Meteorological Institute (DMI) for nuclear emer-
gency preparedness purposes. DERMA is a 3-D Lagrangian long-range dispersion
model using a puff diffusion parameterisation, particle-size dependent deposition pa-
rameterisations and radioactive decay (Sørensen, 1998; Sørensen et al., 1998; Bak-
lanov and Sørensen, 2001). Earlier comparisons of simulations by the DERMA model5
vs. the ETEX experiment involving passive tracers gave very good results. 28 in-
stitutions from most European countries, USA, Canada and Japan contributed to the
real-time model evaluation. Based on analyses from the first experiment, the DERMA
model was emphasised as being very successful (Graziani et al., 1998). In general,
the DERMA model can be used with different sources of NWP data, including the DMI-10
HIRLAM and ECMWF NWP models.
The main objective of the DERMA model is to predict the atmospheric transport,
diffusion, deposition and radioactive decay of a radioactive plume within a range from
about 20 km up to the global scale. For shorter distances the RIMPUFF local-scale
model developed by the Risø NL (Mikkelsen et al., 1984, 1997) can be used. Both15
models are parts of the Danish Nuclear Preparedness System ARGOS (Hoe et al.,
2000).
2.2.2. Weather forecast modelling
The DMI-HIRLAM high-resolution meteorological forecast (up to a few days) or anal-
ysed data (see Fig. 2.2.1: D-version: 0.05◦, N- and E-versions: 0.15◦ or G-version:20
0.45◦, with 1 h time resolution) are used as input data for high-resolution trajectory or
dispersion simulation in the DERMA model. The vertical DMI-HIRLAM model levels
(currently in total 31 levels) are located at 33, 106, 188, 308, etc. meters for a standard
atmosphere.
This model has been running operationally by DMI for the European and Arctic re-25
gions since 1990. The present DMI weather forecasting system is based on an ex-
tended version of the HIRLAM 4.7 model (Ka¨llen, 1996; Sass et al., 2002). The forecast
model is a grid point model. The data assimilation is intermittent, and it is based on the
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3-DVAR scheme. The operational system consists of four nested models called DMI-
HIRLAM-G, -N, -E, and -D. These models differ by e.g. the horizontal resolutions and
integration domains (cf. Fig. 2, the left panel). The NWP forecasting system is run on
the NEC-SX6 supercomputer in connection with other DMI computers. The produced
model level files are archived on the UNITREE Mass Storage System. Therefore, the5
DMI-HIRLAM data can be used in the operational mode or from the archives.
3. Results and Discussions
Using the suggested methodology an evaluation of possible risks and consequences
from hypothetical accidental atmospheric releases of hazardous matter on example of
the “Kursk” nuclear submarine (KNS) operation was realised. Simulation of possible10
consequences on the preparation and operational stages were done for most of the
operation phases (see Table 1). However, for the analysis of the results and discussion
let us consider the most important phases only.
At the preparation stage, the transport probability fields were constructed and
analysed with respect to the locations of the sunken submarine and shipyards in15
Roslyakovo and Snezhnogorsk. At the operational stage, the following phases with
the potential risk – “M” and “H”-levels (cf. Table 1) were considered: a) the lifting of
KNS, b) the transportation to Roslyakovo, c) the setting to dry dock in the Roslyakovo
shipyard; d) the decommissioning in the Snezhnogorsk shipyard – “Nerpa” (removal of
the damaged missiles and the fuel).20
Additionally, at the preparation stage, the earlier calculated transport probability
fields for the nearby Kola Nuclear Power Plant were used for a preliminary investigation
and for the site-sensitivity analysis of the probabilistic fields.
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3.1. Fast transport probability fields during the first day of atmospheric transport
The fast transport probability fields (for both terms of 12 and 24h) were constructed and
analysed for two locations: the sunken Kursk NS and the Kola Nuclear Power Plant (i.e.
over water and land surfaces, respectively). These fields provide useful information
to evaluate the areas of the highest probability of the possible impact (AHPPI), if an5
accidental hypothetical release would have occurred. The fast transport probability
fields (FTPF) during fall (three months combined: September, October, and November)
are shown in Fig. 3 with the isolines drawn every 10% starting from 20.
Mahura et al. (2003) mentioned that during September-October, the westerly flow
is dominant in the sunken NS region. After the first 12 h of atmospheric transport, the10
possibility of reaching the populated territories of the Murmansk region (Russia) was
found to be low, and for the Nordic countries – minimal. At the end of the first day,
the AHPPI boundaries were extended significantly in both meridional and latitudinal
directions, covering the eastern territories of the Kola Peninsula. The main airflow ten-
dencies during November–December were found to be similar, although in December15
the FTPF boundaries were also more farther extended to the west (reaching the north-
ern Finland, Sweden, and Norway) compared with the fall months. Comparison with
July–August showed that, from the atmospheric transport point of view, both Septem-
ber and October (when the operation for the Kursk NS in fact took place) were more
suitable for the lifting and transportation of the submarine, because during summer, the20
largely populated territories of the Kola and Scandinavian Peninsulas were located in-
side the AHPPI zone. The monthly analysis of the fast atmospheric transport, from the
probabilistic point of view, played a role of an indicator not only for the decision-making
process in case of an accidental release, but also for the selection of the preferable
time for the operation.25
After transportation of the submarine (in October 2001) to the Roslyakovo shipyard,
the KNS operation had continued (see Table 1) during the fall of 2001, and therefore,
the fast transport patterns for two types of locations – over the water (KNS) and land
1528
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(KNP) surfaces – should be further evaluated, because the Roslyakovo and Snezhno-
gorsk sites might represent a mixture of atmospheric transport patterns related to both
geographical locations.
During fall, after the first 12 h of atmospheric transport, for both KNS and KNP the
AHPPI boundaries are extended in the eastern direction over the Barents Sea and5
Kola Peninsula, respectively (Fig. 3). Although, the KNP site is located within the
AHPPI boundaries, the KNS site is situated outside of the AHPPI boundaries. This is
related to the fact that the wind speed over the open water is higher compared with the
land surface, and hence, the flow propagates faster from the site region. For the KNS
site, the area (enclosed by the lowest isoline of 20% of AHPPI) of the fast transport10
probability field is larger, and this field is more extended in the north-south direction
compared with KNP. The NRS possible impact will be higher: in the northern Finland
from KNP (≤90% of AHPPI) compared with KNS (≤20%) as well as in Norway (Finmark
County) from KNP (≤60% of AHPPI) compared with KNS (≤35%).
Hence, it can be assumed by interpolating and averaging of the KNP and KNS FT15
probability fields that for the Roslyakovo and Snezhnogorsk shipyards, the most im-
pacted areas outside of Russia could be the northern territories of Finland and Norway
with the NRS possible impact varied in a range between 27–75% of AHPPI. It is very
unlikely that the Swedish territories might be reached during the first 12 h of atmo-
spheric transport from these sites.20
During fall, at the end of the fist day of atmospheric transport, for both sites – KNS
and KNP – the AHPPI boundaries are shifted farther in the eastern direction from the
sites by westerlies; and moreover, they represented by several maxima (which are
extended more in the north-south direction compared with the west-east direction for
the KNS and KNP sites, respectively). For both sites, by the end of the first day the25
Archangelsk Region (Russia) is at the highest risk due to atmospheric transport. Some
peculiarities could be seen from the analysis of these fields. First, for the KNS site the
FTPF boundaries (enclosed by 20% isoline) are more extended to the north of the site
passing over 75◦N, although for the KNP site it is southerly of this latitude. Second, the
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KNS FTPF is also significantly farther extended in the eastern direction compared with
KNP. Third, for KNP there is the higher possibility (local maxima in Fig. 4) of reaching
the southern populated territories of Finland compared to KNS, although for KNS there
is an additional increase in probability of atmospheric transport in the NW sector of the
site. As seen from FTPFs, in general, the atmospheric transport from the KNP site5
occurred in the E vs. SE sector, but for the KNS site – the NE vs. SE sector of the site.
Hence, similarly, interpolating and averaging the KNP and KNS FT probability fields
it can be assumed that for the shipyards in Roslyakovo and Snezhnogorsk, the most
impacted areas could be the Murmansk and Archangelsk Regions of Russia with the
NRS possible impact varied in a range between 40–100% of AHPPI, although there10
might be such possibility also for the western and north-western territories of Finland.
It should be noted that it is possible to use simply a wind direction as an indicator
of the atmospheric transport, but it is valid only on the local scale. It is also possible
to use the climatological maps of baric topography, and although those give a general
insight in the prevailing atmospheric transport over the large areas, they are not directly15
related to a particular site of concern. The statistical interpretation of probability fields
represents the general climatological outlook of the possible atmospheric transport
from a particular site. For a particular meteorological situation or episode, there may
well be possibilities for transport in other directions.
3.2. Maximum possible impact and maximum reaching distance indicators20
Similarly to the fast transport probability field (FTPF), the maximum reaching distance
(MRD) and maximum possible impact zone (MPIZ) indicators during fall were analysed
for both sites – Kursk NS and Kola NPP. The MPIZ indicator, as an integral charac-
teristic, shows areas as well as boundaries with the highest probability of reaching by
trajectories during the first day of transport. The MRD indicator shows the farthest25
boundaries on a geographical map, which might be reached during the first day, at
least, by one trajectory originated over the site location. It should be noted that the
shape of both indicators depends on the prevailing flow patterns.
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During fall, the KNP MRD boundary is less extended in the northern direction com-
pared with the KNS site (cf. Fig. 5). For KNP, this boundary is more farther extended
over the Scandinavian Peninsula as well as farther to the south (reaching 55◦N) com-
pared with KNS, although for KNS this boundary is more extended in both eastern and
south-eastern directions. The KNP MPIZ boundary reaches the KNS region, although5
it is not the same for the KNS MPIZ boundary. Moreover, the KNP MPIZ isoline under-
lines that the territories of the Murmansk Region and Karelia, and partially, the border
region of Finland and parts of the White and Barents Seas are located within the areas
of the highest NRS possible impact. For KNS, the north-western territories of the Kola
Peninsula, Kanin Peninsula, and Barents Sea are enclosed by the MPIZ isoline. The10
estimation of areas enclosed by isolines of these indicators showed that during fall the
MPIZ areas are equal to 49 · 104 km2 and 41 · 104 km2 for the KNS and KNP sites,
respectively. The MRD area for the KNS site is almost 1.8 times higher compared to
the KNP site (i.e. 1588 · 104 km2 vs. 895 · 104 km2).
3.3. Average integral concentration field15
The average integral concentration field for a particular month might be used to calcu-
late average dose characteristics due to inhalation from the passing radioactive cloud
at any selected geographical location at any given day of a particular month. The
summary monthly field might be used to calculate the monthly dose due to inhalation
at any selected geographical location. The examples of averaged 137Cs integrated in20
time concentration fields after 1 day and 5 days of atmospheric transport from the KNS
location in the Roslyakovo shipyard are shown in Figs. 6a and 6b, respectively. The
daily discrete unit hypothetical release at the site during November 2001 was consid-
ered.
The area with the IAC highest orders of magnitude (≤ 1e + 2Bq · h/m3) is extended25
in the NE-SW direction after the first day of atmospheric transport. For the five days of
transport, the IAC area increased more in the NE sector compared with the SW sec-
tor from the site. Among the populated territories only the Kola Peninsula is affected.
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Considering the medium IACs (1e + 2 − 1e + 0Bq · h/m3) it should be noted that the
Murmansk, Archangelsk, and Karelia Regions of Russia, the Finnmark County of Nor-
way, northern and central territories of Finland, and partially the north-east border of
Sweden became affected by the end of the first day of the atmospheric transport. For
the five day transport, the propagation of the radioactive cloud is more extended in the5
NE sector over unpopulated territories of the Arctic Seas. The entire Finland and large
areas of the Russian Northwest could expect the higher possibility of being reached by
the contaminated cloud compared with Sweden and Norway. Moreover, during Novem-
ber the atmospheric transport dominates more by westerlies, and hence, the affected
territories are located to the east of the site compared with the west of the site.10
3.4. Operational dispersion modelling for different phases of the Kursk submarine
operation
Although trajectory modelling for a multiyear period could provide valuable information
for the preliminary evaluation of possible atmospheric transport from the risk site lo-
cation, the real-time modelling is more useful in order to evaluate contamination and15
consequences of possible accidental releases.
In general, for the selection of the specific case studies we used simultaneously
several criteria (Baklanov, 2000; Baklanov and Mahura, 2001). Among these criteria
the most important are direction of atmospheric transport of an accidental release to
the region of interest, possibility of removal over the study region during transport of a20
release, relatively short travel time from the NRS location and large coverage territories
by the radioactive plume.
In this study, the possible contamination of the environment using the DERMA and
DMI-HIRLAM models in forecasting mode was estimated. As a first approximation, the
discrete unit hypothetical release (DUHR) of 1011 Bq/s of 137Cs which occurred daily25
during 6 h at the KNS location was considered. For all specific cases the simulation
of the radionuclide surface air concentration (Bq/m3), wet and dry deposition (Bq/m2)
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fields was performed.
3.4.1. The lifting phase
In our simulation, starting from 24 September 2001, this DUHR occurred daily between
12:00 and 18:00 UTC. During 24 September and 17 October 2001, the simulation of
the radionuclide concentration (Bq/m3), wet and dry deposition (Bq/m2) fields was per-5
formed. For modelling at this phase of the operation the geographical co-ordinates
of KNS in the Barents Sea were used. It should be noted that on the local scale, the
concentration fields are important input to calculation of doses for the population as the
first consequences of accidental releases at risk sites. On the regional scale, the wet
and dry deposition fields are important input to calculation of long-term consequences10
through the food chains. These fields underline boundaries of the geographical territo-
ries under the possible impact of accidental releases at risk sites.
From the total number of calculated operational dispersion cases (24), there are 19
(79%) cases showing transport toward eastern directions (westerly flows). It is in a
good agreement with the results of the isentropic trajectory modelling. It reflected the15
fact that during September and October the westerly flows are dominant, as well as the
fact that AHPPI is located to east from the sunken submarine location. Atmospheric
transport to west occurred only in two cases, as well as transport to south – two cases.
We should mention also that only one case – a hypothetical accidental release occurred
at 3 October 2001 – showed complex atmospheric transport and deposition patterns20
(cf. Fig. 7).
For this case, during the first hours after the hypothetical accidental release at KNS,
the westerly flows dominate in the transport pattern. Starting at 4 October 2001, 06
UTC there is a tendency of easterly flows, and this tendency increases faster in com-
parison with the westerly flow. Starting at 5 October 2001, 09:00 UTC, transport in the25
eastern direction again becomes dominant, and transport toward west diminishes. This
complexity depends on the splitting of the initial radioactive cloud after the first several
hours, and it is due to significant synoptical activity in the region of interest. It should
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be noted that if consider the total unit release of 1Bq of 137Cs than the maximum to-
tal deposition in the source local zone will have a deposition fraction of 10−10 Bq/m2,
over the Kola Peninsula – 10−11, over the Archangelsk Region – 10−12, and over the
Norwegian-Swedish border regions – 10−13.
3.4.2. The transportation phase5
Starting from 8 October 2001 (i.e. during the KNS transportation through the Barents
Sea and Kola Bay to the Roslyakovo shipyard), the DUHR occurred daily between
09:00 and 15:00 UTC during 8–17 October 2001.
During the KNS transportation phase to Roslyakovo, we used approximate co-
ordinates of the proposed route, and at the final phase – co-ordinates of the Roslyakovo10
shipyard. The choice of the co-ordinates as a function of time is very important in such
studies, especially for the local-scale risk analysis. However, it is very problematic to
calculate coordinates precisely during transportation with different speeds, uncertain
route, etc. Hence, a new idea to use GPS in operational simulation for the moving
risk sites is suggested by the ENSEMBLE Project (Galmarini, 2001) and planned to be15
used in future.
For this phase, from the total numbers of calculated cases most of the cases showed
transport toward northern or eastern directions (southerly or westerly flows) to unpopu-
lated areas of the Arctic Ocean seas. Only two cases showed the northerly and north-
westerly flows to the populated areas of the Murmansk and Archangelsk Regions of20
Russia. In example, shown in Fig. 8, during the first half of the day the atmospheric
transport occurred in the western direction and the radioactive plume passed over the
northern territories of Norway. Among all considered cases, this case was only one
showing transport over the Norwegian territory. This plume was later transported to
the north and east passing over the Barents Sea and Novaya Zemlya Archipelago.25
For the total unit release of 1Bq of 137Cs, the maximum deposition in the source
local zone has a fraction of 10−11 and 10−10 Bq/m2 for the dry and wet deposition,
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respectively. The level of deposition in the Russian-Norwegian border regions was one
order of magnitude lower than the level of deposition around the KNS site. However,
the dry deposition decreases faster with distance compared with the wet deposition,
and the tail of the wet deposition field with a fraction of 10−11 extended for a long
distance from the site (up to 1000 km).5
3.4.3. The decommission phase in Roslyakovo
After the transportation through the Kola Bay to the Roslyakovo harbour, the submarine
was relocated from the “Giant-4” barge and set in the dry dock of the Roslyakovo
shipyard during the second and third decades of October 2001. Then, the first step of
the KNS decommissioning phase started in the Roslyakovo shipyard, and it included10
the removal of missiles. One specific case of DUHR of 137Cs at 16 October 2001 is
considered.
Figure 9 shows the 137Cs dry and wet deposition fields at 18 October 2001,
21:00 UTC. During the first day after the hypothetical accidental release at KNS, the
westerly and north-westerly flows dominate in the transport pattern. Starting at 17 Oc-15
tober 2001 there is a tendency of northerly flows, and later of the north-westerly flow
again. The plume reached the Archangelsk Region with the deposition fraction of one-
two orders of magnitude lower than the deposition level in the area of the KNS release.
The deposition fraction over the St.Petersburg Region is of three and four orders of
magnitude lower compared with the KNS release site for the dry and wet deposition,20
respectively.
3.4.4. The decommission phase in Snezhnogorsk
Let us consider the potential risk of airborne contamination for DUHR of 137Cs during
the KNS operation phases #10 and #12, which include the removal of six damaged
missiles and nuclear fuel from KNS in the “Nerpa” dry dock during July–October 2002.25
The hypothetical release from the site started at 10 September 2002, 12:00 UTC,
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and it continued during 1 h with the heights of the primary radioactive plume between
0–500m. The remaining model input data and conditions are similar to the previous
case studies.
Figure 10 presents dynamics of the weather situation based on the DMI-HIRLAM
numerical weather forecast for the region of interest during 10–13 September 2002.5
The wind field maps shown in Fig. 10 represent the forecast by the E-version (15 ×
15 km horizontal resolution) and G-version (45×45 km horizontal resolution) of the DMI-
HIRLAM model. As shown in Fig. 10a, the higher resolution version of the model has a
limitation of the modelling domain close to the KNS location, and hence, depending on
the wind direction from the site the E- or G-version for the dispersion modelling could10
be used.
Figure 11 shows the calculated air concentration (Bq/m3) in the mixing layer at dif-
ferent times after the beginning of DUHR of 137Cs from the risk site. The integrated in
time surface air concentration (Bq × h/m3) and ground-contamination (total deposition
as the sum of dry and wet depositions, in Bq/m2) four days after the release started15
are shown in Fig. 12.
During the first day, the radioactive plume is transported slowly over the Kola Penin-
sula and Karelia to the south, due to low wind velocity within the boundary layer for
this meteorological situation. On the second day, the plume is also extended to the
north over the Barents Sea. An intensive precipitation in the first days after the release20
gives a large area of maximal deposition of radionuclides over the Kola Peninsula and
surrounding areas. On the third day, the plume continued to move in the south-east
and east direction from the site, but concentration decreased fastly and considerably.
3.4.5. Evaluation of possible consequences
It should be stressed again that we do not link the hypothetical accident releases con-25
sidered in the following analysis with the “Kursk” submarine case. In our analysis,
we simply discuss possible consequences and their scales after the most severe hy-
pothetical accident with a ship nuclear reactor. Moreover, it should be noted that all
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completed high and medium potential risk level phases/actions of the KNS operation
were performed successfully, and none of them involved any radioactive contamination
or real risk for the population and the environment.
As it was mentioned above, the simulations were done for a discrete unit hypothetical
release of 137Cs. However, any expert can easily recalculate the concentration and5
deposition fields for any particular release value.
Although the ship reactor accidents may lead to serious environmental conse-
quences, some studies (e.g. NACC, 1998) indicate that any potential naval reactor
accident will not be nearly as severe as the Chernobyl accident. Some calculation of
airborne transport, deposition, and exposure had been made based on an assumed10
release of 1PBq of 137Cs (NACC, 1998; Bergman et al., 1998). It is not obvious that
this amount would actually be released in an accident, even if it is available in the
core. Moreover, the relative uncertainty of the release is estimated to be a factor of
ten. The maximum content of 137Cs in the first and second generation of the Russian
ship reactors is estimated to 5PBq (Gussgard, 1995), while 10PBq may be accumu-15
lated during operation of a typical modern ship reactor (i.e. with a power level slightly
less than 200MW). The KNS core inventory was not available in this study. However,
a rough guess of the Bellona experts based on the known inventories of other sub-
marines (Gerdes et al., 2001; Bellona, 2001) gives 6.2PBq of 137Cs and 5.6PBq of
90Sr.20
Our calculation (based on Figs. 9 and 12) for the total unit release (1Bq) case in-
dicates that the large areas of the Northwest Russia (excluding the Kola Peninsula)
could obtain deposition of a fraction of the order of 10−13 Bq/m2. This corresponds to a
deposition of 100Bq/m2 per 1PBq of airborne release of 137Cs in the accident, i.e. the
level used in the NACC, 1998 study. On the Kola Peninsula the higher deposition den-25
sity (one to two orders of magnitude) might be expected compared with the Northwest
Russia. In our case, 1PBq of 137Cs airborne release corresponds to 1–10 kBq/m2 and
up to 50 kBq/m2 on the Kola Peninsula vs. local scale close to the release site.
For Scandinavia, the direct deposition of 131I or 137Cs on pasture and crops at levels
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falling below 1 kBq/m2 is not likely leading to restrictions in normal agricultural practice
or formal acceptance for commercial use of the food-products (Bergman et al., 1998).
The concentration in reindeer in the Northern Fennoscandia is high, when feeding
during winter on lichens exposed to fallout of radioactive caesium (134Cs and 137Cs).
The ratio between activity concentration in the reindeer meat and deposition density will5
be close to 1 kg/m2 in the latter half of the first winter season after the fallout (Bergman
and A˚gren, 1999). This implies contamination about one order of magnitude higher
than concerning direct deposition in the sensitive food-chain of grass-cow-milk. Intake
of radioactive caesium in groups or populations consuming much reindeer meat is
expected to be high.10
Assuming a release of 1PBq of 137Cs and following Bergman et al., 1998, the levels
of this radionuclide attained in reindeer meat are expected to be: 1) 1 kBq/kg in large
areas on the Kola Peninsula affected by deposition, and 2) one order of magnitude
higher over some smaller areas ranging within a hundred kilometres from the site of
release.15
4. Conclusions
In this study, a combination of several research tools to evaluate the possible atmo-
spheric transport, contamination, and consequences as a result of a discrete unit hy-
pothetical release at a nuclear risk site was used. Among these tools are: 1) isentropic
trajectory modelling for a multiyear period; 2) atmospheric dispersion modelling of ra-20
dioactivity releases for a long-term period, 3) operational emergency response mod-
elling based on numerical weather prediction model data, and 4) statistical analyses of
trajectory and dispersion modelling results. The combined use of the first, second and
fourth tools could be applied (as the first approach) during the preparation stage, and
the third tool (as the second approach) – during the operation stage. The suggested25
methodology is tested on an example of the most important phases of the “Kursk”
nuclear submarine operation.
1538
ACPD
3, 1515–1556, 2003
Methodology for
prediction of risk
A. Baklanov et al.
Title Page
Abstract Introduction
Conclusions References
Tables Figures
J I
J I
Back Close
Full Screen / Esc
Print Version
Interactive Discussion
c© EGU 2003
The temporal variability of several probabilistic indicators (fast transport probability
fields, maximum reaching distance, maximum possible impact zone, and average in-
tegral concentration of 137Cs) showed that the Fall of 2001 was the most appropriate
time for the beginning of the operation. These indicators allowed to identify the most
probably impacted geographical regions and territories. In cases of atmospheric trans-5
port toward the most populated areas, the forecasts of possible consequences during
phases of the high and medium potential risk levels (lifting, transportation, and decom-
missioning of the submarine) based on a unit hypothetical release were performed. The
analysis showed that the possible deposition fractions of 10−11 over the Kola Peninsula,
and 10−12 – 10−13 for the remote areas of the Scandinavia and Northwest Russia could10
be observed.
It is suggested that the combined use of both approaches for the estimation of pos-
sible consequences of accidental releases at nuclear risk sites is more valuable. From
one side, during the preparation stage – the trajectory and dispersion modelling for the
long-term period, and probabilistic fields analysis could provide preliminary information15
about possible directions and probabilities of atmospheric transport from the risk site
locations. From other side, during the operation stage – the real-time modelling could
provide detailed current and forecasted information about the spatial and temporal dis-
tributions of concentration, wet and dry deposition of radionuclides of key importance.
It is concluded that the use of both approaches provides the most valuable basis for20
risk analysis.
Finally, it should be noted that although the “Kursk” nuclear submarine was selected
as an example for this study, the suggested methodology could be used successfully
for any object of potential nuclear, chemical or biological danger.
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Table 1. Potential risk level ranging for the “Kursk” nuclear submarine operation phases
# Phases/actions(∗) Phase date(∗) Potential risk level
1 Accident and sinking 12 Sept. 2000 H/La
2 Lifting preparation 16 July–6 Oct. 2001 L
3 Lifting submarine 7–8 Oct. 2001 M
4 Transportation to Roslyakovo 8–10 Oct. 2001 M
5 Setting in dry dock of Roslyakovo 21–22 Oct. 2001 L
6 Missiles removal Feb. 2002 H/Ua
7 Transportation to Snezhnogorsk 26–27 April 2002 L
8 Setting in dry dock of Nerpa 27–30 April 2002 L
9 1st compartment parts lifting end of May–20 June 2002 Nb
10 6 Damaged missiles removal July 2002 M/Ua
11 1st compartment blasting 8–9 Sept. 2002 Nb
12 Nuclear fuel removal Oct.–Nov. 2002 M
13 Reactor removal Nov. 2002 L
14 Transportation of reactor and fuel after Dec. 2002 Lc
15 Damaged missiles blasting 15 Oct.–15 Nov. 2002 Nb
16 Scrapping submarine after Dec. 2002 N
(∗) All the information was received from the official Kursk Information Web-Site: (Kursk-web-
site, 2001–2002).
Risk categories: H – high, M – middle, L – low, U – unknown, N – no risk,
Comments: a before and after first information received, b local non-nuclear risk, c if a crash or
terror act.
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Fig. 1. Locations of the sunken nuclear submarine “Kursk”, the shipyard in Roslyakovo, the
“Nerpa” shipyard in Snezhnogorsk, and the blasting site.
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DMI-HIRLAM system
• G-version: 0.45 grad
• E, N-versions: 0.15 grad
• D-version: 0.05 grad
ECMWF global model
DERMA model
• 3-D trajectory
model
• Long-range
dispersion
• Deposition of
radionuclides
• Radioactive
decay
ARGOS system
• Radiological
monitoring
• Source term
estimation
• RIMPUFF
local-scale model
• Health effects
 
 
Fig. 2. Structure of the Danish nuclear emergency preparedness long-range modelling system.
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(a)                                                                                 (b) 
 
Fig. 3. Fast transport probability fields after 12 h of atmospheric transport during fall for the (a)
Kola NPP and (b) Kursk NS.
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(a)                                                                                 (b) 
 
Fig. 4. Fast transport probability fields after 24 h of atmospheric transport during fall for the (a)
Kola NPP and (b) Kursk NS.
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(a)                                                                                             (b) 
 
 Fig. 5. Boundaries of the maximum reaching distance (—MRD—) and maximum possible
impact zone (—MPIZ—) indicators during fall for the (a) Kola NPP and (b) Kursk NS.
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(a)                                                                                 (b) 
 
 
Figure 6. Average integral concentration at surface field during November 2001 for the “unit discrete 
hypothetical release” of 137Cs during November 2001 after a) 1 day and b) 5 days of atmospheric transport 
from the Kursk NS site. 
 
Fig. 6. Average integral concentration at surface field during November 2001 for the “unit
discrete hypothetical release” of 137Cs during November 2001 after (a) 1 day and (b) 5 days of
atmospheric ransport from the Kursk NS site.
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(a)                                                                                 (b) 
 
Fig. 7. Specific case of 3 October 2001 for the “unit discrete hypothetical release” of 137Cs at
the accident location: (a) surface air concentration and (b) wet deposition fields at 6 October
2001, 00:00 UTC.
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(a)                                                                                            (b) 
 
Fig. 8. Specific case of 9 October 2001 for the “unit discrete hypothetical release” of 137Cs
during the submarine transportation: (a) dry deposition and (b) wet deposition fields at 11
October 2001, 21:00 UTC.
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(a)                                                                                            (b) 
 
 
Fig. 9. Specific case of 16 October 2001 for the “unit discrete hypothetical release” of 137Cs at
the Roslyakovo shipyard: (a) dry deposition and (b) wet deposition fields at 18 October 2001,
21:00 UTC.
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(a)                                                                                      (b) 
 
 
(c)                                                                                      (d) 
 
 Fig. 10. Specific case of 10 September 2002 – meteorological fields: (a) analysed wind at 10m
for 10 September 2002, 12:00 UTC (DMI-HIRLAM, E-version), (b) forecasted wind at 10m for
13 September 2002, 12:00 UTC (DMI-HIRLAM, G-version), (c) forecasted 6-hour precipitation
for 13 September 2002, 12:00 UTC, and (d) forecasted wind at 10m and temperature at 2m
for 13 September 2002, 12:00 UTC.
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(a)                                                       (b)                                                         (c) 
 
   
 (d)                                                       (e)                                                         (f) 
 
 
Fig. 11. Specific case of 10 September 2002 for the “unit discrete hypothetical release” of 137Cs
at the Snezhnogorsk shipyard (Nerpa): surface air concentration fields at: (a) 11 September
2002, 00:00 UTC, (b) 11 September 2002, 12:00 UTC, (c) 12 September 2002, 00:00 UTC, (d)
12 September 2002, 12:00 UTC, (e) 13 September 2002, 00:00 UTC, and (f) 13 September
2002, 12:00 UTC.
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(a)                                                       (b)                                                         (c) 
 
 
 
Fig. 12. Specific case of 10 September 2002 for the “unit discrete hypothetical release” of
137Cs at the Snezhnogorsk shipyard: (a) surface air concentration field at 14 September 2002,
00:00 UTC; (b) integrated in time air concentration in the surface layer field at 15 September
2002, 18:00 UTC, and (c) total deposition field at 14 September 2002, 00:00 UTC.
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